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REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S SOLE ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD DISREGARD DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT 
AS IT RELIES ON AN ALLEGED FACT DEVOID OF RECORD 
SUPPORT 
Defendant argues that the district court properly dismissed the charge against him 
because he had no intent to deceive anyone when he knowingly issued a check on an 
account with insufficient funds, and because Kirkman's failure to deliver the vehicle title 
prevented defendant from "receiv[ing] any 'money, property or other thing of value'" as 
required by the statute. Aplee. Br. at 7-10. As argued in Appellant's opening brief, 
neither an intent to defraud nor actual receipt of anything of value need be found for a 
conviction of the charged offense. See Aplt. Br. at 11-17. In any event, this Court should 
disregard defendant's argument concerning his lack of intent because it is based on an 
alleged fact which has no support in the record. 
In support of his argument that he harbored no deceptive intent in issuing the 
check on an account with insufficient funds, defendant claims that he not only gave 
"explicit instructions" to Kirkman that the check would not clear until the title was 
delivered, but that Kirkman knew as much because this transaction was "similar to their 
previous business dealings[.]" Aplee. Br. at 5-6, 7, 9. Moreover, defendant represents as 
stipulated facts that he "informed Kirkfman] and Kirkman was aware that the check for 
$4,900.00 would not be funded by defendant and that the check was not to be cashed or 
otherwise negotiated by Kirkman until the automobile title was delivered to defendant." 
Id. at 5. 
However, the record contains no such facts. The parties stipulated to certain facts 
at the beginning of the hearing on defendant's motion, then presented their arguments to 
the trial judge (R. 70: 2-31). Defendant's only record citation in support of his claimed 
"stipulated facts" is the page on which defense counsel's recitation of the stipulated facts 
begins (R..70:7). Aplee. Br. at 5. That page provides: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: As far as I'm concerned, if Mr. Mower - 1 
will proffer this for purposes of this hearing. Mr. Mower would take the 
stand today and testify as to the facts set out on the Statement of Facts down 
one through - one through eight of our Statement of Facts that he has 
personal knowledge of those things. That is to say - and I'll just go through 
them - that he operates a loan business known as A-Quick Title for which 
he loans money secured by titles to vehicles. 
That on the 12th of June, 2002, Mr. Mower, in that capacity, issued a 
check for $4,900 as a loan to an individual by the name of Nick Kirkman 
based upon his promise of delivery that day of an automobile title to secure 
the loan. 
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This was a condition precedent for him to use the funds, and the 
agreement was the title would be delivered. 
Kirkman had previous business dealings with Mr. Mower. They'd 
done this before and without incident. 
The defendant would also testify that it was his policy, particularly in 
loans of this type, that until he received the title that he would not place 
sufficient funds in his own account for a check of that size to clear. 
(R. 70: 7). Nothing on that page establishes that defendant explained to Kirkman when 
he gave him the check that it would not clear the bank. Even the stipulated fact that 
Kirkman had prior business dealings with defendant would not give Kirkman any reason 
to know that the check was not backed by sufficient funds unless defendant had expressly 
told him so.1 Nothing in the record suggests such an exchange had ever occurred. The 
stipulation continued thereafter with no mention that defendant told Kirkman that the 
check was not fully funded (R. 70:7-13). 
Not only were there no such stipulated facts, but the parties argued opposing points 
of view on the issue (R. 42-46; R. 70: 15, 20-22, 24, 27-29). The prosecutor actively 
argued that Kirkman deposited the check in the credit union because he believed it was 
good and that he acted in accordance with one who believes that they possess a fully 
negotiable check (R. 70: 20-24). That argument would have been unavailable had the 
State stipulated to the facts as defendant states them. On rebuttal, defense counsel argued 
lrThe record suggests no basis on which to assume that Kirkman had ever failed to 
deliver a promised title to defendant in the past, had cashed defendant's check before 
delivering title only to discover that the check was not funded, or had ever had any other 
dealing with defendant that did not involve a contemporaneous exchange of vehicle title 
for loan check. 
3 
that even assuming the State's argument was correct and Mr. Kirkman did not think the 
check was good, defendant had no criminal liability (R. 70:27-29). Defense counsel also 
stated, "And I'm wondering if the State thinks it would make a difference if- if Kirkman 
knew that the check wasn't good right then. You know, maybe it would" (R. 70: 29). 
The parties' arguments, therefore, establish that there were no such stipulated facts. 
Kirkman was not present at the hearing to establish the degree of his knowledge (R. 70:4-
5), and the trial court's subsequent Findings of Fact are devoid of support for defendant's 
"stipulated facts" (R.. 58-59). 
Because the stipulated facts do not include a statement that defendant informed 
Kirkman that the account contained insufficient funds or that Kirkman was otherwise 
informed of the fact, defendant's appellate argument rests on "facts" unsupported by the 
record and should be disregarded. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should disregard defendant's argument concerning his lack of intent 
and reverse the trial court's order of dismissal based on the arguments presented in the 
State's opening brief. 
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